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Abstract
The present paper investigates consequence relations that are both non-monotonic and paraconsistent. More
precisely, we put the focus on preferential consequence relations, i.e. those relations that can be defined by a
binary preference relation on states labelled by valuations. We worked with a general notion of valuation that
covers e.g. the classical valuations as well as certain kinds of many-valued valuations. In the many-valued cases,
preferential consequence relations are paraconsistant (in addition to be non-monotonic), i.e. they are capable of
drawing reasonable conclusions which contain contradictions. The first purpose of this paper is to provide in
our general framework syntactic characterizations of several families of preferential relations. The second and
main purpose is to provide, again in our general framework, characterizations of several families of preferential-
discriminative consequence relations. They are defined exactly as the plain version, but any conclusion such that
its negation is also a conclusion is rejected (these relations bring something new essentially in the many-valued
cases).
∗This is an updated version of the paper of the same title published in The Journal of Logic and Computation. This version
just contains a better presentation (so the numbering of definitions and propositions is different).
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1 Introduction
In many situations, we are confronted with incomplete and/or inconsistent information and the clas-
sical consequence relation proves to be insufficient. Indeed, in case of inconsistent information,
it leads to accept every formula as a conclusion, which amounts to loose the whole information.
Therefore, we need other relations leading to non-trivial conclusions in spite of the presence of con-
tradictions. So, several paraconsistent consequence relations have been developed. In the present
paper, we will pay attention in particular to certain many-valued ones [Bel77b, Bel77a, DdC70,
CMdA00, dACM02, AA94, AA96, AA98]. They are defined in frameworks where valuations can
assign more than two different truth values to formulas. In fact, they tolerate contradictions within
the conclusions, but reject the principle of explosion according to which a single contradiction entails
the deduction of every formula.
In case of incomplete information, the classical consequence relation also shows its limits. In-
deed, no risk is taken, the conclusions are sure, but too few. We need other relations leading to accept
as conclusions formulas that are not necessarily sure, but still plausible. Eventually, some “hasty”
conclusions will be rejected later, in the presence of additional information. So, a lot of plausible
(generally non-monotonic) consequence relations have been developed. Choice functions are cen-
tral tools to define plausible relations [Che54, Arr59, Sen70, AM81, Leh02, Leh01, Sch92, Sch04].
Indeed, suppose we have at our disposal a function µ, called a choice function, which chooses in
any set of valuations V , those elements which are preferred, not necessarily in the absolute sense,
but when the valuations in V are the only ones under consideration. Then, we can define a plausible
consequence relation in the following natural way: a formula α follows from a set of formulas Γ iff
every model for Γ chosen by µ is a model for α.
In the present paper, we put the focus on a particular family of choice functions. Let us present
it. Suppose we are given a binary preference relation ≺ on states labelled by valuations (in the
style of e.g. [KLM90, Sch04]). This defines naturally a choice function. Indeed, choose in any
set of valuations V , each element that labels a state which is ≺-preferred among those states which
are labelled by the elements of V . Those choice functions which can be defined in this manner
constitute the aforementioned family. The consequence relations defined by this family will be
called preferential consequence relations.
For a long time, research efforts on paraconsistent relations and plausible relations were sep-
arated. However, in many applications, the information is both incomplete and inconsistent. For
instance, the semantic web or big databases inevitably contain inconsistencies. This can be due to
human or material imperfections as well as contradictory sources of information. On the other hand,
neither the web nor big databases can contain “all” information. Indeed, there are rules of which
the exceptions cannot be enumerated. Also, some information might be left voluntarily vague or in
concise form. Consequently, consequence relations that are both paraconsistent and plausible are
useful to reason in such applications.
Such relations first appear in e.g. [Pri91, Bat98, KL92, AA00, KM02]. The idea begins by taking
a many-valued framework to get paraconsistency. Then, only those models that are most preferred
according to some particular binary preference relation on valuations (in the style of [Sho88, Sho87])
are relevant for making inference, which provides plausibility. In [AL01b, AL01a], A. Avron and I.
Lev generalized the study to families of binary preference relations which compare two valuations
using, for each of them, this part of a certain set of formulas it satisfies. The present paper follows
this line of research by combining many-valued frameworks and choice functions.
More explicitly, we will investigate preferential consequence relations in a general framework.
According to the different assumptions which will be made about the latter, it will cover various
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kinds of frameworks, including e.g. the classical propositional one as well as certain many-valued
ones. Moreover, in the many-valued frameworks, preferential relations are paraconsistent (in addi-
tion to be plausible). However, they do not satisfy the Disjunctive Syllogism (from α and ¬α ∨ β
we can conclude β), whilst they satisfy it in classical framework.
In addition, we will investigate preferential-discriminative consequence relations. They are de-
fined exactly as the plain version, but any conclusion such that its negation is also a conclusion is
rejected. In the classical framework, they do not bring something really new. Indeed, instead of con-
cluding everything in the face of inconsistent information, we will simply conclude nothing. On the
other hand, in the many-valued frameworks, where the conclusions are non-trivial even from incon-
sistent information, the discriminative version will reject the contradictions among them, rendering
them all the more rational.
The contribution of the present paper can now be summarized in one sentence: we characterized,
in a general framework, several (sub)families of preferential(-discriminative) consequence relations.
In many cases, our characterizations are purely syntactic. This has a lot of advantages, let us quote
some important ones. Take some syntactic conditions that characterize a family of those consequence
relations. This gives a syntactic point of view on this family defined semantically, which enables us
to compare it to conditions known on the “market”, and thus to other consequence relations. This
can also give rise to questions like: if we modified the conditions in such and such a natural-looking
way, what would happen on the semantic side? More generally, this can open the door to questions
that would not easily come to mind otherwise or to techniques of proof that could not have been
employed in the semantic approach.
Several characterizations can be found in the literature for preferential relations (e.g. [Gab85,
Mak89, Mak94, KLM90, LM92, Leh02, Leh01, Sch92, Sch96, Sch00, Sch04]). We will provide
some new ones, though to do so we have been strongly inspired by techniques of K. Schlechta
[Sch04]. In fact, our innovation is rather related to the discriminative version. To the author knowl-
edge, the present paper is the first systematic work of characterization for preferential-discriminative
consequence relations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce our general framework
and the different assumptions which sometimes will be made about it. We will see that it covers in
particular the many-valued frameworks of the well-known paraconsistent logics FOUR and J3. In
Section 2.2, we present choice functions and some of their well-known properties. In Section 2.3,
we define preferential(-discriminative) consequence relations and give examples in both the classical
and the many-valued frameworks. We will also recall a characterization which involves the well-
known system P of Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor. In section 3, we provide our characterizations.
Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
2 Background
2.1 Semantic structures
2.1.1 Definitions and properties
We will work with general formulas, valuations, and satisfaction. A similar approach has been taken
in two well-known papers [Mak05, Leh01].
Definition 1 We say that S is a semantic structure iff S = 〈F ,V , |=〉 where F is a set, V is a set,
and |= is a relation on V × F .
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Intuitively, F is a set of formulas, V a set of valuations for these formulas, and |= a satisfaction
relation for these objects (i.e. v |= α means the formula α is satisfied in the valuation v, i.e. v is a
model for α).
Notation 2 Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure, Γ ⊆ F , and V ⊆ V . Then,
MΓ := {v ∈ V : ∀ α ∈ Γ, v |= α},
T (V ) := {α ∈ F : V ⊆Mα},
D := {V ⊆ V : ∃ Γ ⊆ F ,MΓ = V }.
Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, and F the set of all wffs of L. Then,
Td(V ) := {α ∈ F : V ⊆Mα and V 6⊆M¬α},
Tc(V ) := {α ∈ F : V ⊆Mα and V ⊆M¬α},
C := {V ⊆ V : ∀ α ∈ F , V 6⊆Mα or V 6⊆M¬α}.
Intuitively, MΓ is the set of all models for Γ and T (V ) the set of all formulas satisfied in V . Every
element of T (V ) belongs either to Td(V ) or Tc(V ), according to whether its negation is also in
T (V ). D is the set of all those sets of valuations that are definable by a set of formulas and C the
set of all those sets of valuations that do not satisfy both a formula and its negation. As usual, MΓ,α,
T (V, v) stand for respectively MΓ∪{α}, T (V ∪ {v}), etc.
Remark 3 The notations MΓ, T (V ), etc. should contain the semantic structure on which they are
based. To increase readability, we will omit it. There will never be any ambiguity. We will omit
similar things with other notations in the sequel, for the same reason.
A semantic structure defines a basic consequence relation:
Notation 4 We denote by P the power set operator.
Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure.
We denote by ⊢ the relation on P(F)×F such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , ∀ α ∈ F ,
Γ ⊢ α iff MΓ ⊆Mα.
Let |∼ be a relation on P(F)×F . Then,
|∼(Γ) := {α ∈ F : Γ |∼ α}.
Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, F the set of all wffs of L, and Γ ⊆ F .
Then, we say that Γ is consistent iff ∀ α ∈ F , Γ 6⊢ α or Γ 6⊢ ¬α.
The following trivial facts hold, we will use them implicitly in the sequel:
Remark 5 Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure and Γ,∆ ⊆ F . Then:
MΓ,∆ =MΓ ∩M∆;
⊢(Γ) = T (MΓ);
MΓ =M⊢(Γ);
Γ ⊆ ⊢(∆) iff ⊢(Γ) ⊆ ⊢(∆) iff M∆ ⊆MΓ.
Sometimes, we will need some of the following assumptions about a semantic structure:
Definition 6 Suppose 〈F ,V , |=〉 is a semantic structure.
Then, define the following assumptions about it:
(A1) V is finite.
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Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, and F the set of all wffs of L. Then, define:
(A2) ∀ Γ ⊆ F , ∀ α ∈ F , if α 6∈ T (MΓ) and ¬α 6∈ T (MΓ), then MΓ ∩Mα 6⊆M¬α.
Suppose ∨ and ∧ are binary connectives of L. Then, define:
(A3) ∀ α, β ∈ F , we have:
Mα∨β =Mα ∪Mβ ;
Mα∧β =Mα ∩Mβ ;
M¬¬α =Mα;
M¬(α∨β) = M¬α∧¬β;
M¬(α∧β) = M¬α∨¬β .
Clearly, those assumptions are satisfied by classical semantic structures, i.e. structures where F , V ,
and |= are classical. In addition, we will see, in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, that they are satisfied also
by certain many-valued semantic structures.
2.1.2 The semantic structure defined by FOUR
The logic FOUR was introduced by N. Belnap in [Bel77a, Bel77b]. This logic is useful to deal
with inconsistent information. Several presentations are possible, depending on the language under
consideration. For the needs of the present paper, a classical propositional language will be sufficient.
The logic has been investigated intensively in e.g. [AA94, AA96, AA98], where richer languages,
containing an implication connective⊃ (first introduced by A. Avron [Avr91]), were considered.
Notation 7 We denote by A a set of propositional symbols (or atoms).
We denote by Lc the classical propositional language containing A, the usual constants false and
true, and the usual connectives ¬, ∨, and ∧.
We denote by Fc the set of all wffs of Lc.
We recall a possible meaning for the logic FOUR (more details can be found in [CLM99, Bel77a,
Bel77b]). Consider a system in which there are, on the one hand, sources of information and, on the
other hand, a processor that listens to them. The sources provide information about the atoms only,
not about the compound formulas. For each atom p, there are exactly four possibilities: either the
processor is informed (by the sources, taken as a whole) that p is true; or he is informed that p is
false; or he is informed of both; or he has no information about p.
Notation 8 Denote by 0 and 1 the classical truth values and define:
f := {0}; t := {1}; ⊤ := {0, 1}; ⊥ := ∅.
The global information given by the sources to the processor can be modelled by a function s fromA
to {f , t,⊤,⊥}. Intuitively, 1 ∈ s(p) means the processor is informed that p is true, whilst 0 ∈ s(p)
means he is informed that p is false.
Then, the processor naturally builds information about the compound formulas from s. Before
he starts to do so, the situation can be be modelled by a function v from Fc to {f , t,⊤,⊥} which
agrees with s about the atoms and which assigns ⊥ to all compound formulas. Now, take p and q in
A and suppose 1 ∈ v(p) or 1 ∈ v(q). Then, the processor naturally adds 1 to v(p ∨ q). Similarly, if
0 ∈ v(p) and 0 ∈ v(q), then he adds 0 in v(p ∨ q). Of course, such rules hold for ¬ and ∧ too.
Suppose all those rules are applied recursively to all compound formulas. Then, v represents the
“full” (or developed) information given by the sources to the processor. Now, the valuations of the
logic FOUR can be defined as exactly those functions that can be built in this manner (i.e. like v)
from some information sources. More formally,
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Definition 9 We say that v is a four-valued valuation iff v is a function fromFc to {f , t,⊤,⊥} such
that v(true) = t, v(false) = f and ∀ α, β ∈ Fc,
1 ∈ v(¬α) iff 0 ∈ v(α);
0 ∈ v(¬α) iff 1 ∈ v(α);
1 ∈ v(α ∨ β) iff 1 ∈ v(α) or 1 ∈ v(β);
0 ∈ v(α ∨ β) iff 0 ∈ v(α) and 0 ∈ v(β);
1 ∈ v(α ∧ β) iff 1 ∈ v(α) and 1 ∈ v(β);
0 ∈ v(α ∧ β) iff 0 ∈ v(α) or 0 ∈ v(β).
We denote by V4 the set of all four-valued valuations.
The definition may become more accessible if we see the four-valued valuations as those functions
that satisfy Tables 1, 2, and 3 below:
v(α) v(¬α)
f t
t f
⊤ ⊤
⊥ ⊥
Table 1.
v(β)
f t ⊤ ⊥
v(α)
f f t ⊤ ⊥
t t t t t
⊤ ⊤ t ⊤ t
⊥ ⊥ t t ⊥
v(α ∨ β)
Table 2.
v(β)
f t ⊤ ⊥
v(α)
f f f f f
t f t ⊤ ⊥
⊤ f ⊤ ⊤ f
⊥ f ⊥ f ⊥
v(α ∧ β)
Table 3.
In the logic FOUR, a formula α is considered to be satisfied iff the processor is informed that it is
true (it does not matter whether he is also informed that α is false).
Notation 10 We denote by |=4 the relation on V4 ×Fc such that ∀ v ∈ V4, ∀ α ∈ Fc, we have
v |=4 α iff 1 ∈ v(α).
Proof systems for the consequence relation ⊢ based on the semantic structure 〈Fc,V4, |=4〉 (i.e. the
semantic structure defined by FOUR) can be found in e.g. [AA94, AA96, AA98].
Note that the FOUR semantic structure satisfies (A3). In addition, if A is finite, then (A1)
is also satisfied. However, (A2) is not satisfied by this structure. In Section 2.1.3, we turn to a
many-valued semantic structure which satisfies (A2).
2.1.3 The semantic structure defined by J3
The logic J3 was introduced in [DdC70] to answer a question posed in 1948 by S. Jas´kowski, who
was interested in systematizing theories capable of containing contradictions, especially if they occur
in dialectical reasoning. The step from informal reasoning under contradictions and formal reasoning
with databases and information was done in [CMdA00] (also specialized for real database models in
[dACM02]), where another formulation of J3 called LFI1 was introduced, and its first-order version,
semantics and proof theory were studied in detail. Investigations of J3 have also been made in e.g.
[Avr91], where richer languages than our Lc were considered.
The valuations of the logic J3 can be given the same meaning as those of the logic FOUR,
except that the consideration is restricted to those sources which always give some information
about an atom. More formally,
Definition 11 We say that v is a three-valued valuation iff v is a function from Fc to {f , t,⊤} such
that v(true) = t, v(false) = f and ∀ α, β ∈ Fc,
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1 ∈ v(¬α) iff 0 ∈ v(α);
0 ∈ v(¬α) iff 1 ∈ v(α);
1 ∈ v(α ∨ β) iff 1 ∈ v(α) or 1 ∈ v(β);
0 ∈ v(α ∨ β) iff 0 ∈ v(α) and 0 ∈ v(β);
1 ∈ v(α ∧ β) iff 1 ∈ v(α) and 1 ∈ v(β);
0 ∈ v(α ∧ β) iff 0 ∈ v(α) or 0 ∈ v(β).
We denote by V3 the set of all three-valued valuations.
As previously, the definition may become more accessible if we see the three-valued valuations as
those functions that satisfy Tables 4, 5, and 6 below:
v(α) v(¬α)
f t
t f
⊤ ⊤
Table 4.
v(β)
f t ⊤
v(α)
f f t ⊤
t t t t
⊤ ⊤ t ⊤
v(α ∨ β)
Table 5.
v(β)
f t ⊤
v(α)
f f f f
t f t ⊤
⊤ f ⊤ ⊤
v(α ∧ β)
Table 6.
We turn to the satisfaction relation.
Notation 12 We denote by |=3 the relation on V3 ×Fc such that ∀ v ∈ V3, ∀ α ∈ Fc, we have
v |=3 α iff 1 ∈ v(α).
Proof systems for the consequence relation ⊢ based on the semantic structure 〈Fc,V3, |=3〉 (i.e. the
semantic structure defined by J3) have been provided in e.g. [Avr91, DdC70] and chapter IX of
[Eps90]. The J3 structure satisfies (A3) and (A2). In addition, if A is finite, then it satisfies (A1)
too.
2.2 Choice functions
2.2.1 Definitions and properties
In many situations, an agent has some way to choose in any set of valuations V , those elements that
are preferred (the bests, the more normal, etc.), not necessarily in the absolute sense, but when the
valuations in V are the only ones under consideration. In Social Choice, this is modelled by choice
functions [Che54, Arr59, Sen70, AM81, Leh02, Leh01].
Definition 13 Let V be a set, V ⊆ P(V), W ⊆ P(V), and µ a function from V to W.
We say that µ is a choice function iff ∀ V ∈ V, µ(V ) ⊆ V .
Several properties for choice functions have been put in evidence by researchers in Social Choice.
Let us present two important ones (a better presentation can be found in [Leh01]). Suppose W is
a set of valuations, V is a subset of W , and v ∈ V is a preferred valuation of W . Then, a natural
requirement is that v is a preferred valuation of V . Indeed, in many situations, the larger a set is,
the harder it is to be a preferred element of it, and he who can do the most can do the least. This
property appears in [Che54] and has been given the name Coherence in [Mou85].
We turn to the second property. SupposeW is a set of valuations, V is a subset ofW , and suppose
all the preferred valuations of W belong to V . Then, they are expected to include all the preferred
valuations of V . The importance of this property has been put in evidence by [Aiz85, AM81] and
has been given the name Local Monotonicity in e.g. [Leh01].
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Definition 14 Let V be a set, V ⊆ P(V), W ⊆ P(V), and µ a choice function from V to W.
We say that µ is coherent iff ∀ V,W ∈ V,
if V ⊆W, then µ(W ) ∩ V ⊆ µ(V ).
We say that µ is locally monotonic (LM) iff ∀ V,W ∈ V,
if µ(W ) ⊆ V ⊆W, then µ(V ) ⊆ µ(W ).
In addition to their intuitive meanings, these properties are important because, as was shown by
K. Schlechta in [Sch00], they characterize those choice functions that can be defined by a binary
preference relation on states labelled by valuations (in the style of e.g. [KLM90]). We will take a
closer look at this in Section 2.2.2.
When a semantic structure is under consideration, two new properties can be defined. Each of
them conveys a simple and natural meaning.
Definition 15 Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure, V ⊆ P(V), W ⊆ P(V), and µ a choice
function from V to W.
We say that µ is definability preserving (DP) iff
∀ V ∈ V ∩D, µ(V ) ∈ D.
Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, and F the set of all wffs of L.
We say that µ is coherency preserving (CP) iff
∀ V ∈ V ∩C, µ(V ) ∈ C.
Definability Preservation has been put in evidence first in [Sch92]. One of its advantages is that when
the choice functions under consideration satisfy it, we will provide characterizations with purely
syntactic conditions. To the author knowledge, the present paper is the first to introduce Coherency
Preservation. An advantage of this property is that when the choice functions under consideration
satisfy it, we will not need to assume (A2) to show our characterizations (in the discriminative case).
2.2.2 Preference structures
Binary preference relations on valuations have been investigated by e.g. B. Hansson to give se-
mantics for deontic logics [Han69]. Y. Shoham rediscovered them to give semantics for plausible
non-monotonic logics [Sho88, Sho87]. Then, it seems that Imielinski is one of the first persons to
introduce binary preference relations on states labelled by valuations [Imi87]. They have been used
to give more general semantics for plausible non-monotonic logics, see e.g. [KLM90, LM92, Sch92,
Sch96, Sch00, Sch04]. Let us present them.
Definition 16 We say that R is a preference structure on a set V iff R = 〈S, l,≺〉 where S is a set,
l is a function from S to V , and ≺ is a relation on S × S.
In fact, preference structures are essentially Kripke structures. The difference lies in the interpre-
tation of ≺. In a Kripke structure, it is seen as an accessibility relation, whilst, in a preference
structure, it is seen as a preference relation. We recall a possible meaning for preference structures
(see e.g. [KLM90, Sch04] for details about meaning). Intuitively, V is a set of valuations for some
language L and S a set of valuations for some language L′ richer than L. The elements of S are
called states. l(s) corresponds precisely to this part of s that is about the formulas of L only. We call
l a labelling function. Finally, ≺ is a preference relation, i.e. s ≺ s′ means s is preferred to s′.
We turn to well-known properties for preference structures.
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Definition 17 Suppose V is a set, R = 〈S, l,≺〉 is a preference structure on V , S ⊆ S, s ∈ S,
V ⊆ V , and V ⊆ P(V).
We say that R is transitive (resp. irreflexive) iff ≺ is transitive (resp. irreflexive).
We say that s is preferred in S iff ∀ s′ ∈ S, s′ 6≺ s.
L(V ) := {s ∈ S : l(s) ∈ V } (intuitively, L(V ) contains the states labelled by the elements of V ).
We say that R is V-smooth (alias V-stoppered) iff ∀ V ∈ V, ∀ s ∈ L(V ),
either s is preferred in L(V ) or there exists s′ preferred in L(V ) such that s′ ≺ s.
A preference structure defines naturally a choice function. The idea is to choose in any set of valu-
ations V , each element which labels a state which is preferred among all the states labelled by the
elements of V .
Definition 18 SupposeR = 〈S, l,≺〉 is a preference structure on a set V .
We denote by µR the function from P(V) to P(V) such that ∀ V ⊆ V ,
µR(V ) = {v ∈ V : ∃ s ∈ L(v), s is preferred in L(V )}.
In [Sch00], Schlechta showed that Coherence and Local Monotonicity characterize those choice
functions that can be defined by a preference structure. Details are given in the proposition just
below. It is an immediate corollary of Proposition 2.4, Proposition 2.15, and Fact 1.3 of [Sch00].
Proposition 19 Taken from [Sch00].
Let V be a set, V and W subsets of P(V), and µ a choice function from V to W. Then,
(0) µ is coherent iff there exists a transitive and irreflexive preference structure R on V such that
∀ V ∈ V, we have µ(V ) = µR(V ).
Suppose ∀ V,W ∈ V, we have V ∪W ∈ V and V ∩W ∈ V. Then,
(1) µ is coherent and LM iff there exists a V-smooth, transitive, and irreflexive preference structure
R on V such that ∀ V ∈ V, we have µ(V ) = µR(V ).
In fact, in [Sch00], the codomain of µ is required to be its domain: V. However, this plays no role
in the proofs. Therefore, verbatim the same proofs are valid when the codomain of µ is an arbitrary
subset W of P(V). Both myself and Schlechta checked it.
2.3 Preferential(-discriminative) consequence relations
2.3.1 Definitions
Suppose we are given a semantic structure and a choice function µ on the valuations. Then, it is
natural to conclude a formula α from a set of formulas Γ iff every model for Γ chosen by µ is a
model for α. More formally:
Definition 20 Suppose S = 〈F ,V , |=〉 is a semantic structure and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
We say that |∼ is a preferential consequence relation iff there exists a coherent choice function µ
from D to P(V) such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , ∀ α ∈ F ,
Γ |∼ α iff µ(MΓ) ⊆Mα.
In addition, if µ is LM, DP, etc., then so is |∼.
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These consequence relations are called “preferential” because, in the light of Proposition 19, they
can be defined equivalently with preference structures, instead of coherent choice functions. They
lead to “jump” to plausible conclusions which will eventually be withdrawn later, in the presence of
additional information. Therefore, they are useful to deal with incomplete information. We will give
an example with a classical semantic structure in Section 2.4.1.
In addition, if a many-valued semantic structure is considered, they lead to rational and non-
trivial conclusions is spite of the presence of contradictions and are thus useful to treat both incom-
plete and inconsistent information. However, they will not satisfy the Disjunctive Syllogism. We
will give an example with the FOUR semantic structure in Section 2.4.2.
Now, we turn to a qualified version of preferential consequence. It captures the idea that the
contradictions in the conclusions should be rejected.
Definition 21 Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, F the set of all wffs of L,
〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure, and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
We say that |∼ is a preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff there is a coherent choice
function µ from D to P(V) such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , ∀ α ∈ F ,
Γ |∼ α iff µ(MΓ) ⊆Mα and µ(MΓ) 6⊆M¬α.
In addition, if µ is LM, DP, etc., then so is |∼.
If a classical semantic structure is considered, the discriminative version does not bring something
really new. Indeed, the only difference will be to conclude nothing instead of everything in the
face of inconsistent information. On the other hand, with a many-valued structure, the conclusions
are rational even from inconsistent information. The discriminative version will then reject the
contradictions in the conclusions, rendering the latter all the more rational.
In Definitions 20 and 21, the domain of the choice function is D. This is natural as only the
elements of D play a role in the definition of a preferential(-discriminative) consequence relation.
This point of view has been adopted in e.g. [Leh01] (see Section 6). Now, one might want a
definition with choice functions of which the domain is P(V). In fact, some families of relations
can be defined equivalently with D or P(V). For instance, as is noted in [Leh01], if µ is a coherent
choice function from D to P(V), then the function µ′ from P(V) to P(V) defined by µ′(V ) =
V ∩ µ(MT (V )) is a coherent choice function which agrees with µ on D.
Several characterizations for preferential consequence relations can be found in the literature
(e.g. [KLM90, LM92, Leh02, Leh01, Sch92, Sch96, Sch00, Sch04]). In particular, we will recall
(in Section 2.4) a characterization that involves the well-known system P of [KLM90].
As said previously, in the light of Proposition 19, preferential(-discriminative) consequence re-
lations could have been introduced equivalently with preference structures. We opted for coherent
choice functions for two reasons. First, they give a clearer meaning. Indeed, properties like Co-
herence have simple intuitive justifications, whilst preference structures contain “states”, but it is
not perfectly clear what a state is in daily life. By the way, in [KLM90], Kraus, Lehmann, and
Magidor did not consider preference structures to be ontological justifications for their interest in
the formal systems investigated, but to be technical tools to study those systems and in particular
settle questions of interderivability and find efficient decision procedures (see the end of Section 1.2
of [KLM90]).
Second, in the proofs, we will work directly with choice functions and their properties, not with
preference structures. By the way, the techniques developed in the present paper (especially in the
discriminative case) can certainly be adapted to new properties.
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2.4 The system P
Gabbay, Makinson, Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor investigated extensively properties which should
be satisfied by plausible non-monotonic consequence relations [Gab85, Mak89, Mak94, KLM90,
LM92]. A certain set of properties, called the system P, plays a central role in this area. It is
essentially due to Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [KLM90] and has been investigated further in
[LM92]. Let’s present it.
Definition 22 Suppose L is a language containing the usual connectives ¬ and ∨, F the set of all
wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure, and |∼ a relation on F × F .
Then, the system P is the set of the six following conditions: ∀ α, β, γ ∈ F ,
Reflexivity α |∼ α
Left Logical Equivalence ⊢ α↔ β α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ
Right Weakening ⊢ α→ β γ |∼ α
γ |∼ β
Cut α ∧ β |∼ γ α |∼ β
α |∼ γ
Cautious Monotonicity α |∼ β α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
Or α |∼ γ β |∼ γ
α ∨ β |∼ γ
Note that α ∧ β is a shorthand for ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β). Similarly, α→ β and α↔ β are shorthands. Note
again that P without Or is called C. The system C is closely related to the cumulative inference
which was investigated by Makinson in [Mak89]. In addition, it seems to correspond to what Gabbay
proposed in [Gab85]. Concerning the rule Or, it corresponds to the axiom CA of conditional logic.
All the properties in P are sound if we read α |∼ β as “β is a plausible consequence of α”.
In addition, P is complete in the sense that it characterizes those consequence relations that can be
defined by a smooth transitive irreflexive preference structure. This is what makes P central. More
formally:
Definition 23 Suppose 〈F ,V , |=〉 is a semantic structure.
Then, Df := {V ⊆ V : ∃ α ∈ F , V =Mα}.
Suppose L is a language containing the usual connectives ¬ and ∨, and F the set of all wffs of L.
Then define the following condition: ∀ v ∈ V , ∀ α, β ∈ F , ∀ Γ ⊆ F ,
(KLM0) v |= ¬α iff v 6|= α;
(KLM1) v |= α ∨ β iff v |= α or v |= β.
(KLM2) if for every finite subset ∆ of Γ, M∆ 6= ∅, then MΓ 6= ∅.
Note that (KLM2) is called “assumption of compactness” in [KLM90].
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Proposition 24 [KLM90] Suppose L is a language containing the usual connectives ¬ and ∨, F
the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (KLM0)–(KLM2), and |∼ a
relation of F × F .
Then, |∼ satisfies all the properties of P iff there exists a Df -smooth transitive irreflexive preference
structureR on V such that ∀ α, β ∈ F , α |∼ β iff µR(Mα) ⊆Mβ .
Note that |∼ is a relation on F × F , not P(F) × F . This difference is crucial. Indeed, if we adapt
the conditions of P in the obvious way to relations on P(F) × F and if we replace Df by D in
Proposition 24, then the latter does no longer hold. This negative result was shown by Schlechta in
[Sch92].
Now, by Propositions 19 and 24, we immediately get the following representation theorem:
Proposition 25 Suppose Definition 20 (of preferential consequence relations) is adapted in the ob-
vious way to relations onF×F (essentially, replace D by Df ), L is a language containing the usual
connectives ¬ and ∨, F the set of all wffs of L, |∼ a relation on F × F , and 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic
structure such that (KLM0)–(KLM2) hold and ∀ V,W ∈ Df , V ∪W ∈ Df and V ∩W ∈ Df .
Then, LM preferential consequence relations are precisely those relations that satisfy the system P.
2.4.1 Example with a classical semantic structure
Let L be a classical propositional language of which the atoms are r, q, and p. Intuitively, r means
Nixon is a republican, q means Nixon is a quaker, and p means Nixon is a pacifist. Let F be the set
of all wffs of L, V the set of all classical two-valued valuations of L, and |= the classical satisfaction
relation for these objects. Then, V is the set of the 8 following valuations: v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6,
and v7, which are defined in the obvious way by the following table:
r q p
v0 0 0 0
v1 0 0 1
v2 0 1 0
v3 0 1 1
v4 1 0 0
v5 1 0 1
v6 1 1 0
v7 1 1 1
Now, consider the class of all republicans and the class of all quakers. Consider that a republican
is normal iff he is not a pacifist and that a quaker is normal iff he is a pacifist. And, consider that a
valuation v is more normal than a valuation w from the point of view of a class C iff
• Nixon is an individual of C in both v and w;
• Nixon is normal in v;
• Nixon is not normal in w.
In the following graph, there is an arrow from a valuation v to a valuation w iff v is more normal
than w from the point of view of some class:
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Given those considerations a natural preference structure on V is R = 〈V , l,≺〉, where l is identity
and ≺ is the relation such that ∀ v, w ∈ V , we have v ≺ w iff (1) or (2) below holds (i.e. there is an
arrow from v to w):
(1) v |= r and v |= ¬p and w |= r and w 6|= ¬p;
(2) v |= q and v |= p and w |= q and w 6|= p.
Finally, let |∼ be the preferential consequence relation defined by the coherent choice function µR.
Then, |∼ leads us to “jump” to plausible conclusions from incomplete information and to revise
previous “hasty” conclusions in the face of new and fuller information. For instance, r |∼ ¬p and
{r, p} 6|∼ ¬p and q |∼ p and {q,¬p} 6|∼ p.
However, |∼ is not paraconsistent. In addition, some sets of formulas are rendered useless,
because there is no preferred model for them, though there are models for them. For instance,
{q, r} |∼ α, ∀ α ∈ F .
2.4.2 Example with the FOUR semantic structure
Consider the FOUR semantic structure 〈Fc,V4, |=4〉 and supposeA = {r, q, p} (these objects have
been defined in Section 2.1.2). In addition, make the same considerations about Nixon, the classes,
normality, etc., as in Section 2.4.1, except that this time a valuation v is considered to be more normal
than a valuation w from the point of view of a class C iff
• in both v and w, the processor is informed that Nixon is an individual of C;
• in v, he is informed that Nixon is normal and not informed of the contrary;
• in w, he is not informed that Nixon is normal.
See Section 2.1.2 for recalls about the sources-processor systems. Given those considerations a
natural preference structure on V4 is R = 〈V4, l,≺〉, where l is identity and ≺ is the relation such
that ∀ v, w ∈ V4, we have v ≺ w iff (1) or (2) below holds (i.e. v is more normal than w from the
point of view of some class):
(1) v |= r and v |= ¬p and v 6|= p and w |= r and w 6|= ¬p;
(2) v |= q and v |= p and v 6|= ¬p and w |= q and w 6|= p.
Let |∼ be the preferential consequence relation defined by the coherent choice function µR.
Then, again we “jump” to plausible conclusions and revise previous “hasty” conclusions. For
instance, r |∼ ¬p and {r, p} 6|∼ ¬p and q |∼ p and {q,¬p} 6|∼ p.
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In addition, |∼ is paraconsistent. For instance, {p,¬p, q} |∼ p and {p,¬p, q} |∼ ¬p and
{p,¬p, q} |∼ q and {p,¬p, q} 6|∼ ¬q. And, it happens less often that a set of formulas is ren-
dered useless because there is no preferred model for it, though there are models for it. For instance,
this time, {q, r} |∼ p and {q, r} |∼ ¬p and {q, r} |∼ q and {q, r} 6|∼ ¬q and {q, r} |∼ r and
{q, r} 6|∼ ¬r.
However, |∼ does not satisfy the Disjunctive Syllogism. Indeed, for instance, {¬r, r ∨ q} 6|∼ q.
3 Contributions
The main contributions of the present paper are summarized below. We characterized (in many cases,
by purely syntactic conditions) families of preferential and preferential-discriminative consequence
relations. Sometimes, we will need to make some assumptions about the semantic structure under
consideration. However, no assumption will be needed for the three following families:
• the preferential consequence relations (Section 3.2);
• the DP preferential consequence relations (Section 3.1);
• the DP LM preferential consequence relations (Section 3.1).
We will assume (A1) and (A3) for:
• the CP preferential-discriminative consequence relations (Section 3.4);
• the CP DP preferential-discriminative consequence relations (Section 3.3);
• the CP DP LM preferential-discriminative consequence relations (Section 3.3).
And, we will need (A1), (A2), and (A3) for:
• the preferential-discriminative consequence relations (Section 3.4);
• the DP preferential-discriminative consequence relations (Section 3.3);
• the DP LM preferential-discriminative consequence relations (Section 3.3).
3.1 The non-discriminative and definability preserving case
The characterizations in this section have already been given in Proposition 3.1 of [Sch00], under the
assumption that a classical propositional semantic structure is considered. Using the same techniques
as those of Schlechta, we show easily that his characterizations hold with any semantic structure.
Notation 26 Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
Then, consider the following conditions: ∀ Γ,∆ ⊆ F ,
(|∼0) if ⊢(Γ) = ⊢(∆), then |∼(Γ) = |∼(∆);
(|∼1) ⊢(|∼(Γ)) = |∼(Γ);
(|∼2) Γ ⊆ |∼(Γ);
(|∼3) |∼(Γ,∆) ⊆ ⊢(|∼(Γ),∆);
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(|∼4) if Γ ⊆ ⊢(∆) ⊆ |∼(Γ), then |∼(Γ) ⊆ |∼(∆).
Note that those conditions are purely syntactic when there is a proof system available for ⊢ (which
is the case with e.g. the classical, FOUR, and J3 semantic structures).
Proposition 27 Let S = 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F . Then,
(0) |∼ is a DP preferential consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼1), (|∼2), and (|∼3) hold;
(1) |∼ is a DP LM preferential consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼1), (|∼2), (|∼3), and (|∼4) hold.
Proof Proof of (0). Direction: “→”.
By hypothesis, there exists a DP coherent choice function µ from D to P(V) such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F ,
|∼(Γ) = T (µ(MΓ)). We will show:
(0.0) |∼ satisfies (|∼0);
(0.1) |∼ satisfies (|∼1);
(0.2) |∼ satisfies (|∼2).
Before turning to (|∼3), we need a preliminary result:
(0.3) ∀ Γ ⊆ F , we have µ(MΓ) =M|∼(Γ);
(0.4) |∼ satisfies (|∼3).
Direction: “←”.
Suppose |∼ satisfies (|∼0), (|∼1), (|∼2), and (|∼3).
Let µ be the function from D to P(V) such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , µ(MΓ) = M|∼(Γ).
Then, µ is well-defined.
Indeed, If Γ,∆ ⊆ F and MΓ = M∆, then ⊢(Γ) = ⊢(∆), thus, by (|∼0), |∼(Γ) = |∼(∆).
In addition, µ is obviously DP. We show the following which ends the proof:
(0.5) µ is a choice function;
(0.6) µ is coherent;
(0.7) ∀ Γ ⊆ F , we have |∼(Γ) = T (µ(MΓ)).
Proof of (0.0). Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F and suppose ⊢(Γ) = ⊢(∆).
Then, MΓ =M∆. Thus, |∼(Γ) = T (µ(MΓ)) = T (µ(M∆)) = |∼(∆).
Proof of (0.1). Let Γ ⊆ F . Then, ⊢(|∼(Γ)) = ⊢(T (µ(MΓ))) = T (MT (µ(MΓ))) = |∼(Γ).
Proof of (0.2). Let Γ ⊆ F . Then, Γ ⊆ T (MΓ) ⊆ T (µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
Proof of (0.3). Let Γ ⊆ F . As, µ is DP, µ(MΓ) ∈ D.
Thus, ∃ Γ′ ⊆ F , µ(MΓ) =MΓ′ . Therefore, µ(MΓ) = MΓ′ = MT (MΓ′ ) =MT (µ(MΓ)) = M|∼(Γ).
Proof of (0.4). Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F . As, MΓ,∆ ⊆MΓ and µ is coherent, µ(MΓ) ∩MΓ,∆ ⊆ µ(MΓ,∆).
Therefore, |∼(Γ,∆) = T (µ(MΓ,∆)) ⊆ T (µ(MΓ) ∩MΓ,∆) = T (µ(MΓ) ∩M∆).
Thus, by (0.0), |∼(Γ,∆) ⊆ T (M|∼(Γ) ∩M∆) = T (M|∼(Γ),∆) = ⊢(|∼(Γ),∆).
Proof of (0.5). Let Γ ⊆ F . Then, µ(MΓ) = M|∼(Γ), which is, by (|∼2), a subset of MΓ.
Proof of (0.6). Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F and suppose MΓ ⊆M∆.
Then, µ(M∆) ∩MΓ =M|∼(∆) ∩MΓ =M|∼(∆),Γ.
But, by (|∼3), M|∼(∆),Γ ⊆M|∼(∆,Γ) = µ(M∆,Γ) = µ(MΓ).
15
Proof of (0.7). Let Γ ⊆ F . Then, by (|∼1), |∼(Γ) = ⊢(|∼(Γ)) = T (M|∼(Γ)) = T (µ(MΓ)).
Proof of (1). Direction: “→”.
Verbatim the same proof as for (0), except that in addition µ is LM.
We use it to show that |∼ satisfies (|∼4).
Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F and suppose Γ ⊆ ⊢(∆) ⊆ |∼(Γ).
Then, by (0.3), µ(MΓ) = M|∼(Γ) ⊆M⊢(∆) =M∆ ⊆MΓ.
Therefore, as µ is locally monotonic, µ(M∆) ⊆ µ(MΓ).
Thus, |∼(Γ) = T (µ(MΓ)) ⊆ T (µ(M∆)) = |∼(∆).
Direction: “←”.
Verbatim the same proof as for (0), except that in addition (|∼4) is satisfied.
We use it to show that µ is locally monotonic.
Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F and suppose µ(MΓ) ⊆M∆ ⊆MΓ.
Then, M|∼(Γ) ⊆M∆ ⊆MΓ. Therefore, Γ ⊆ T (MΓ) ⊆ T (M∆) = ⊢(∆).
On the other hand, ⊢(∆) = T (M∆) ⊆ T (M|∼(Γ)) = ⊢(|∼(Γ)) which is, by (|∼1), equal to |∼(Γ).
Thus, by (|∼4), we have |∼(Γ) ⊆ |∼(∆). Therefore, µ(M∆) = M|∼(∆) ⊆M|∼(Γ) = µ(MΓ).
3.2 The non-discriminative and not necessarily definability preserving case
In this section, we will characterize the family of all preferential consequence relations. Unlike in
Section 3.1, our conditions will not be purely syntactic (i.e. using only ⊢, |∼, etc.). In fact, properties
like Coherence cannot be translated in syntactic terms because the choice functions under consid-
eration are not necessarily definability preserving. Indeed, we do no longer have at our disposal
the equality: µ(MΓ) = M|∼(Γ), which is of great help to perform the translation and which holds
precisely because of Definability Preservation.
In Proposition 5.2.11 of [Sch04], K. Schlechta provided a characterization of the aforementioned
family, under the assumption that a classical propositional semantic structure is considered. Note that
most of his work is done in a very general, in fact algebraic, framework. Only at the end, he applied
his general lemmas in a classical framework to get the characterization. The conditions he gave, as
ours, are not purely syntactic (e.g. they involve the notion of model, etc.). Moreover, some limits of
what can be done in this area have been put in evidence by Schlechta. Approximatively, he showed
in Proposition 5.2.15 of the same book that, in an infinite classical framework, there does not exist
a characterization containing only conditions which are universally quantified, of limited size, and
using only simple operations (like e.g. ∪, ∩, \).
The purpose of the present section is to provided a new characterization, more elegant than the
one of Schlechta and that hold with any semantic structure. To do so, we have been inspired by
the algebraic part of the work of Schlechta (see Proposition 5.2.5 of [Sch04]). Technically, the idea
begins by building from any function f , a coherent choice functionµf such that whenever f “covers”
some coherent choice function, it necessarily covers µf .
Definition 28 Let V be a set, V and W subsets of P(V), and f a function from V to W.
We denote by µf the function from V to P(V) such that ∀ V ∈ V,
µf (V ) = {v ∈ V : ∀W ∈ V, if v ∈W ⊆ V, then v ∈ f(W )}.
Lemma 29 Let V be a set, V and W subsets of P(V), and f a function from V to W.
Then, µf is a coherent choice function.
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Proof µf is obviously a choice function. It remains to show that it is coherent.
Suppose V,W ∈ V, V ⊆W , and v ∈ µf (W ) ∩ V . We show v ∈ µf (V ).
To do so, suppose the contrary, i.e. suppose v 6∈ µf (V ).
Then, as v ∈ V , we have ∃ Z ∈ V, Z ⊆ V , v ∈ Z , and v 6∈ f(Z).
But, V ⊆W , thus Z ⊆W . Therefore, by definition of µf , v 6∈ µf (W ), which is impossible.
Lemma 30 Let V be a set, V, W, and X subsets of P(V), f a function from V to W, and µ a
coherent choice function from V to X such that ∀ V ∈ V, f(V ) = MT (µ(V )).
Then, ∀ V ∈ V, f(V ) = MT (µf (V )).
Proof Let V ∈ V. We show f(V ) = MT (µf (V )).
Case 1: ∃ v ∈ µ(V ), v 6∈ µf (V ).
As µ(V ) ⊆ V , we have v ∈ V .
Thus, by definition of µf , ∃W ∈ V, W ⊆ V , v ∈W , and v 6∈ f(W ) = MT (µ(W )) ⊇ µ(W ).
On the other hand, as µ is coherent, µ(V ) ∩W ⊆ µ(W ). Thus, v ∈ µ(W ), which is impossible.
Case 2: µ(V ) ⊆ µf (V ).
Case 2.1: ∃ v ∈ µf (V ), v 6∈ f(V ).
Then, ∃W ∈ V, W ⊆ V , v ∈ W , and v 6∈ f(W ). Indeed, just take V itself for the choice of W .
Therefore, v 6∈ µf (V ), which is impossible.
Case 2.2: µf (V ) ⊆ f(V ).
Then, f(V ) = MT (µ(V )) ⊆MT (µf (V )) ⊆MT (f(V )) = MT (MT (µ(V ))) = MT (µ(V )) = f(V ).
Now, everything is ready to show the representation result.
Notation 31 Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
Then, consider the following condition: ∀ Γ ⊆ F ,
(|∼5) |∼(Γ) = T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈M|∼(∆)}).
Proposition 32 Let 〈F ,V , |=〉 be a semantic structure and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
Then, |∼ is a preferential consequence relation iff (|∼5) holds.
Proof Direction: “→”.
There exists a coherent choice function µ from D to P(V) such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = T (µ(MΓ)).
Let f be the function from D to D such that ∀ V ∈ D, we have f(V ) =MT (µ(V )).
By Lemma 30, ∀ V ∈ D, we have f(V ) = MT (µf (V )).
Note that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) =MT (µ(MΓ)) = M|∼(Γ).
We show that (|∼5) holds. Let Γ ⊆ F .
Then, |∼(Γ) = T (µ(MΓ)) = T (MT (µ(MΓ))) = T (f(MΓ)) = T (MT (µf (MΓ))) = T (µf(MΓ)) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀W ∈ D, if v ∈W ⊆MΓ, then v ∈ f(W )}) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈ f(M∆)}) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈M|∼(∆)}).
Direction: “←”.
Suppose |∼ satisfies (|∼5).
Let f be the function from D to D such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , we have f(MΓ) =M|∼(Γ).
Note that f is well-defined. Indeed, if Γ,∆ ⊆ F and MΓ =M∆, then, by (|∼5), |∼(Γ) = |∼(∆).
In addition, by (|∼5), we clearly have ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = T (µf(MΓ)).
And finally, by Lemma 29, µf is a coherent choice function.
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3.3 The discriminative and definability preserving case
In this section, we will characterize certain families of DP preferential-discriminative consequence
relations. To do so, we will develop new techniques (especially Lemmas 39 and 40 below). We need
basic notations and an inductive construction:
Notation 33 N denotes the natural numbers including 0: {0, 1, 2, . . . , }.
N
+ denotes the strictly positive natural numbers: {1, 2, . . . , }.
Z denotes the integers.
Let i, j ∈ Z. Then, [i, j] denotes the set of all k ∈ Z such that i ≤ k ≤ j.
Let L be a language, ∨ a binary connective of L, F the set of all wffs of L, and β1, β2, . . . , βr ∈ F .
Whenever we write β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . . ∨ βr, we mean (. . . ((β1 ∨ β2) ∨ β3) ∨ . . . ∨ βr−1) ∨ βr.
Definition 34 Let L be a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, F the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉
a semantic structure, |∼ a relation on P(F)×F , and Γ ⊆ F . Then,
H1(Γ) := {¬β ∈ F : β ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ) and ¬β 6∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ))}.
Let i ∈ N with i ≥ 2. Then,
Hi(Γ) := {¬β ∈ F :
{
β ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ), H1(Γ), . . . , Hi−1(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ) and
¬β 6∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ), H1(Γ), . . . , Hi−1(Γ))
}.
H(Γ) :=
⋃
i∈N+
Hi(Γ).
Definition 35 Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, ∨ a binary connective of L, F
the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure, and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
Then, consider the following conditions: ∀ Γ,∆ ⊆ F , ∀ α, β ∈ F ,
(|∼6) if β ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ) and ¬α ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ),¬β), then α 6∈ |∼(Γ);
(|∼7) if α ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ) and β ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ),¬α) \ |∼(Γ), then α ∨ β 6∈ |∼(Γ);
(|∼8) if α ∈ |∼(Γ), then ¬α 6∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ));
(|∼9) if ∆ ⊆ ⊢(Γ), then |∼(Γ) ∪H(Γ) ⊆ ⊢(∆, |∼(∆), H(∆),Γ);
(|∼10) if Γ ⊆ ⊢(∆) ⊆ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ), H(Γ)), then |∼(Γ) ∪H(Γ) ⊆ ⊢(∆, |∼(∆), H(∆));
(|∼11) if Γ is consistent, then |∼(Γ) is consistent, Γ ⊆ |∼(Γ), and ⊢(|∼(Γ)) = |∼(Γ).
Note that those conditions are purely syntactic when there is a proof system available for ⊢.
Proposition 36 Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, ∨ and ∧ binary connectives
of L, F the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (A1) and (A3), and |∼ a
relation on P(F)×F . Then,
(0) |∼ is a CP DP preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8),
(|∼9), and (|∼11) hold;
(1) |∼ is a CP DP LM preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8),
(|∼9), (|∼10), and (|∼11) hold.
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Suppose 〈F ,V , |=〉 satisfies (A2) too. Then,
(2) |∼ is a DP preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8), and
(|∼9) hold;
(3) |∼ is a DP LM preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8),
(|∼9), and (|∼10) hold.
The proof of Proposition 36 has been relegated at the end of Section 3.3. We need first Notation 33,
Definition 37 and Lemmas 38, 39, and 40 below. Here are some purely technical tools:
Definition 37 Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, ∨ a binary connective of L, F
the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (A1), |∼ a relation on P(F)×F ,
and Γ ⊆ F . Then,
M1Γ := {v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ) : ∃ β ∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ), v 6∈M¬β}.
Let i ∈ N with i ≥ 2. Then,
M iΓ := {v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ)\M
1
Γ∪. . .∪M
i−1
Γ : ∃β ∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)\M
1
Γ∪. . .∪M
i−1
Γ )\|∼(Γ), v 6∈M¬β}.
M ′Γ :=
⋃
i∈N+
M iΓ
n(Γ) := |{i ∈ N+ : M iΓ 6= ∅}|
Suppose M1Γ 6= ∅. Then, we denote by β1Γ an element of F , chosen arbitrarily, such that
∃ r ∈ N+, ∃ v1, v2, . . . , vr ∈ V , and ∃ β1, β2, . . . , βr ∈ F with M1Γ = {v1, v2, . . . , vr},
β1Γ = β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . . ∨ βr,
and ∀ j ∈ [1, r], βj 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβj , and vj 6∈M¬βj .
As M1Γ 6= ∅ and M1Γ is finite (thanks to (A1)), such an element exists.
Suppose i ∈ N, i ≥ 2, and M iΓ 6= ∅.
Then, we denote by βiΓ an element of F , chosen arbitrarily, such that
∃ r ∈ N+, ∃ v1, v2, . . . , vr ∈ V , and ∃ β1, β2, . . . , βr ∈ F with M iΓ = {v1, v2, . . . , vr},
βiΓ = β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . . ∨ βr,
and ∀ j ∈ [1, r], βj 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
i−1
Γ ⊆Mβj , and vj 6∈M¬βj .
As M iΓ 6= ∅ and M iΓ is finite, such an element exists.
Suppose M ′Γ 6= ∅. Then,
βΓ := β
1
Γ ∨ β
2
Γ ∨ . . . ∨ β
n(Γ)
Γ
As M ′Γ 6= ∅, n(Γ) ≥ 1. In addition, we will show in Lemma 38 below that n(Γ) is finite and
∀ i ∈ N+ with i ≤ n(Γ), M iΓ 6= ∅. Thus, βΓ is well-defined.
F (Γ) :=
{
{¬βΓ} if M ′Γ 6= ∅
∅ otherwise
G(Γ) := {α ∈ F : α 6∈ |∼(Γ), ¬α 6∈ |∼(Γ), and Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α) ⊆ |∼(Γ)}
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Here are some quick results about the purely technical tools defined just above:
Lemma 38 Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, ∨ a binary connective of L, F
the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (A1), |∼ a relation on P(F)×F ,
Γ ⊆ F , and i, j ∈ N+. Then,
(0) if i 6= j, then M iΓ ∩M
j
Γ = ∅;
(1) if M iΓ = ∅, then M
i+1
Γ = ∅;
(2) Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)) ⊆ |∼(Γ) iff M1Γ = ∅;
(3) if i ≥ 2, then Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
i−1
Γ ) ⊆ |∼(Γ) iff M iΓ = ∅;
(4) n(Γ) is finite;
(5) if i ≤ n(Γ), then M iΓ 6= ∅;
(6) if i > n(Γ), then M iΓ = ∅;
(7) if M ′Γ 6= ∅, then M ′Γ =M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
n(Γ)
Γ ;
(8) Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M
′
Γ) ⊆ |∼(Γ).
Proof Proofs of (0), (1), (2), and (3). Trivial.
Proof of (4). Obvious by (0) and (A1).
Proof of (5). Suppose ∃ i ∈ N+, M iΓ = ∅ and i ≤ n(Γ).
Then, by (1), ∀ j ∈ N+, j ≥ i, M jΓ = ∅.
Thus, |{j ∈ N+ : M jΓ 6= ∅}| ≤ i− 1 < n(Γ), which is impossible.
Proof of (6). Suppose ∃ i ∈ N+, M iΓ 6= ∅ and i > n(Γ).
Then, by (1), ∀ j ∈ N+, j ≤ i, M jΓ 6= ∅.
Thus, |{j ∈ N+ : M jΓ 6= ∅}| ≥ i > n(Γ), which is impossible.
Proof of (7). Obvious by (6).
Proof of (8). Case 1: M ′Γ = ∅.
Then, Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)). In addition, M1Γ = ∅. Thus, by (2), we are done.
Case 2: M ′Γ 6= ∅.
Then, by (7), Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
n(Γ)
Γ ).
In addition, n(Γ) + 1 ≥ 2 and, by (6), Mn(Γ)+1Γ = ∅. Thus, by (3), we are done.
We turn to an important lemma. Its main goal is to show that the conditions (|∼6), (|∼7), and (|∼8)
are sufficient to establish the following important equality: |∼(Γ) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ)), which
provides a semantic definition of |∼ (in the discriminative manner).
Lemma 39 Suppose L is a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, ∨ and ∧ binary connectives of L,
F the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (A1) and (A3), |∼ a relation on
P(F)×F satisfying (|∼6), (|∼7), and (|∼8), and Γ ⊆ F . Then,
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(0) if M ′Γ 6= ∅, then βΓ 6∈ |∼(Γ);
(1) if M ′Γ 6= ∅, then MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆MβΓ ;
(2) if M ′Γ 6= ∅, then M ′Γ ∩M¬βΓ = ∅;
(3) if M ′Γ 6= ∅, then MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ ⊆M¬βΓ;
(4) MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M
′
Γ = MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ);
(5) |∼(Γ) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ));
(6) MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ);
(7) |∼(Γ) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ)).
Proof Proof of (0), (1), and (2). Suppose M ′Γ 6= ∅.
Then, it suffices to show by induction: ∀ i ∈ [1, n(Γ)],
p3(i) (M
1
Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
i
Γ) ∩M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ) = ∅;
p2(i) MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ1Γ∨...∨βiΓ ;
p1(i) β
1
Γ ∨ . . . ∨ β
i
Γ 6∈ |∼(Γ).
As M1Γ 6= ∅, ∃ r ∈ N+, ∃ v1, v2, . . . , vr ∈ V , and ∃β1, β2, . . . , βr ∈ F , M1Γ = {v1, . . . , vr},
β1Γ = β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βr, and ∀ j ∈ [1, r], βj 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβj , and vj 6∈M¬βj .
Then, it can be shown that:
(0.0) p3(1) holds;
(0.1) p2(1) holds;
(0.2) p1(1) holds.
Now, let i ∈ [1, n(Γ)− 1] and suppose p1(i), p2(i), and p3(i) hold.
As M i+1Γ 6= ∅, ∃ r ∈ N+, ∃ v1, v2, . . . , vr ∈ V , and ∃ β1, β2, . . . , βr ∈ F ,
M i+1Γ = {v1, . . . , vr}, β
i+1
Γ = β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βr, and
∀ j ∈ [1, r], βj 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M
1
Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
i
Γ ⊆Mβj , and vj 6∈M¬βj .
Then, it can be shown that:
(0.3) p3(i+ 1) holds;
(0.4) p2(i+ 1) holds.
Before turning to p1(i+ 1), we need the following:
(0.5) β1Γ ∨ . . . ∨ β
i
Γ ∨ β1 ∨ β2 ∨ . . . ∨ βr 6∈ |∼(Γ);
(0.6) p1(i+ 1) holds.
Proof of (0.0). If vj ∈M1Γ, then vj 6∈M¬βj . But, by (A3), M¬β1Γ ⊆M¬βj .
Proof of (0.1). We have MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ1 which is, by (A3), a subset of Mβ1Γ .
Proof of (0.2). It suffices to show by induction: ∀ j ∈ [1, r],
q(j) β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βj 6∈ |∼(Γ).
Obviously, q(1) holds.
Let j ∈ [1, r − 1]. Suppose q(j). We show q(j + 1).
By (A3), we have MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ1∨...∨βj .
On the other hand, MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬(β1∨...∨βj) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβj+1 .
Thus, by q(j) and (|∼7) (where α is β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βj and β is βj+1), we get β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βj+1 6∈ |∼(Γ).
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Proof of (0.3). Let v ∈M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M i+1Γ . We show v 6∈M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βi+1Γ ).
Case 1: v ∈M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ.
Then, by p3(i), we have v 6∈M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ). But, by (A3), M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βi+1Γ ) ⊆M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ).
Case 2: v ∈M i+1Γ .
Then, ∃ j ∈ [1, r], v = vj . Thus, v 6∈M¬βj . But, by (A3), M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βi+1Γ ) ⊆M¬βi+1Γ ⊆M¬βj .
Proof of (0.4). By p2(i), MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ1Γ∨...∨βiΓ which is, by (A3), a subset of Mβ1Γ∨...∨βi+1Γ .
Proof of (0.5). It suffices to show by induction ∀ j ∈ [1, r]:
q(j) β1Γ ∨ . . . ∨ β
i
Γ ∨ β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βj 6∈ |∼(Γ).
We will show:
(0.5.0) MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ) ⊆Mβ1 .
Then, by p1(i), p2(i), (0.5.0), and (|∼7) (where α is β1Γ ∨ . . . ∨ βiΓ and β is β1), q(1) holds.
Now, let j ∈ [1, r − 1] and suppose q(j).
Then, we will show:
(0.5.1) MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ∨β1∨...∨βj) ⊆Mβj+1 .
In addition, by p2(i) and (A3), we get:
(0.5.2) MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ1Γ∨...∨βiΓ∨β1∨...∨βj .
By, (0.5.1), (0.5.2), q(j), and (|∼7) (where α is β1Γ ∨ . . . ∨ βiΓ ∨ β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βj and β is βj+1),
we get that q(j + 1) holds.
Proof of (0.5.0). Let v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ). Then, v ∈M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ).
Thus, by p3(i), v 6∈M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ. Therefore, v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ ⊆Mβ1 .
Proof of (0.5.1). Let v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ∨β1∨...∨βj). Then, by (A3), v ∈M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ).
Therefore, by p3(i), v 6∈M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ. Therefore, v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ ⊆Mβj+1 .
Proof of (0.6). By p2(i) and (A3), we get MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ1Γ∨...∨βiΓ ⊆Mβ1Γ∨...∨βiΓ∨β1∨...∨βr .
In addition, by (A3), we get M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βiΓ∨β1∨...∨βr) =M¬(β1Γ∨...∨βi+1Γ ).
Therefore, by (0.5) and (|∼6) (where α is β1Γ ∨ . . . ∨ βi+1Γ and β is β1Γ ∨ . . . ∨ βiΓ ∨ β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βr),
we get that p1(i+ 1) holds.
Proof of (3). Suppose M ′Γ 6= ∅, v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ, and v 6∈M¬βΓ .
Then, by (0), (1), and definition ofM iΓ, we get v ∈M
n(Γ)+1
Γ , which is impossible by Lemma 38 (6).
Proof of (4). Case 1: M ′Γ 6= ∅.
By (3), we get one direction: MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ .
By (2), we get the other direction: MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ.
Case 2: M ′Γ = ∅.
Then, obviously,MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M ′Γ = MΓ,|∼(Γ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ).
Proof of (5). Direction: “⊆”.
Case 1: M ′Γ 6= ∅.
Suppose the contrary of what we want to show, i.e. suppose ∃ α ∈ |∼(Γ), α 6∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ).
Then, MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ ⊆M|∼(Γ) ⊆Mα. Thus, MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ ⊆M¬α.
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Consequently, by (0), (1), and (|∼6), we get α 6∈ |∼(Γ), which is impossible.
Case 2: M ′Γ = ∅.
Let α ∈ |∼(Γ). Then, MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆M|∼(Γ) ⊆Mα. In addition, by (|∼8), MΓ,|∼(Γ) 6⊆M¬α.
Consequently, α ∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ)).
Direction: “⊇”. Obvious by (4) and Lemma 38 (8).
Proof of (6). Direction: “⊆”.
Case 1: M ′Γ = ∅.
Case 1.1: H1(Γ) 6= ∅.
Then, ∃ α ∈ F , α 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆ Mα, and MΓ,|∼(Γ) 6⊆ M¬α. Thus, α ∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Therefore, by (5), α ∈ |∼(Γ), which is impossible.
Case 1.2: H1(Γ) = ∅.
Clearly, ∀ i ∈ N+, if Hi(Γ) = ∅, then Hi+1(Γ) = ∅. Therefore, H(Γ) = ∅ = F (Γ).
Case 2: M ′Γ 6= ∅.
As, M ′Γ ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ), we get, by (2), MΓ,|∼(Γ) 6⊆M¬βΓ .
Thus, by (0) and (1), we get ¬βΓ ∈ H1(Γ) ⊆ H(Γ). Therefore, MH(Γ) ⊆MF (Γ).
Direction: “⊇”.
Case 1: M ′Γ = ∅.
Verbatim the proof of Case 1 of direction “⊆”.
Case 2: M ′Γ 6= ∅.
Then, the following holds:
(6.0) ∀i ∈ N+, MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ),...,Hi(Γ).
Now, suppose the contrary of what we want to show, i.e. suppose
∃ v ∈ MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ , v 6∈ MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ). Then, v 6∈ MH(Γ). But, clearly, MH(Γ) =
⋂
i∈N+ MHi(Γ).
Therefore, ∃ i ∈ N+, v 6∈MHi(Γ), which is impossible by (6.0).
Proof of (6.0). We show by induction: ∀i ∈ N+,
p(i) MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ),...,Hi(Γ).
We will show
(6.0.0) p(1) holds.
Let i ∈ N+, suppose p(i) holds, and suppose p(i+ 1) does not hold.
Then, ∃ v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ , v 6∈MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ),...,Hi+1(Γ).
Thus, ∃ j ∈ [1, i+ 1], v 6∈MHj(Γ).
Case 1: j = 1.
Then, ∃ β ∈ F , MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ , β 6∈ |∼(Γ), and v 6∈M¬β .
Thus v ∈M1Γ ∩M¬βΓ , which is impossible by (2).
Case 2: j ≥ 2.
Then, ∃ β ∈ F , MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ),...,Hj−1(Γ) ⊆Mβ , β 6∈ |∼(Γ), and v 6∈M¬β .
But, by Lemma 38 (7), by (4), and p(i), we get
MΓ,|∼(Γ) \ M
1
Γ ∪ . . . ∪ M
n(Γ)
Γ = MΓ,|∼(Γ) \ M
′
Γ = MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ ⊆ MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ),...,Hi(Γ) ⊆
MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ),...,Hj−1(Γ) ⊆Mβ .
Therefore, v ∈Mn(Γ)+1Γ , which is impossible by Lemma 38 (6).
Proof of (6.0.0). Suppose the contrary of what we want to show, i.e.
suppose ∃ v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬βΓ , v 6∈MΓ,|∼(Γ),H1(Γ).
Then, v 6∈MH1(Γ). Thus, ∃ β ∈ F , MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ , β 6∈ |∼(Γ), and v 6∈M¬β .
Thus v ∈M1Γ. Therefore, v ∈M ′Γ ∩M¬βΓ , which is impossible by (2).
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Proof of (7). Obvious by (5) and (6).
We turn to a second important lemma. Its main purpose is to show that any DP choice function µ
representing (in the discriminative manner) a relation |∼ satisfies the following equality: µ(MΓ) =
MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ), which enables us to define µ from |∼.
Lemma 40 SupposeL is a language,¬ a unary connective ofL, ∨ and∧ binary connectives ofL, F
the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (A1) and (A3), V ⊆ P(V), µ a DP
choice function from D to V, |∼ the relation on P(F)×F such that ∀Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)),
and Γ ⊆ F . Then:
(0) µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ);
(1) |∼ satisfies (|∼6);
(2) |∼ satisfies (|∼7);
(3) |∼ satisfies (|∼8);
(4) M ′Γ ∩ µ(MΓ) = ∅;
(5) MΓ,|∼(Γ),Tc(µ(MΓ)) = µ(MΓ);
(6) if M ′Γ 6= ∅, then MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = µ(MΓ).
If 〈F ,V , |=〉 satisfies (A2) too, then:
(7) if M ′Γ = ∅, then MG(Γ) = MTc(µ(MΓ));
(8) if M ′Γ = ∅, then MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆MG(Γ);
(9) MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = µ(MΓ).
If µ is coherency preserving, then again:
(10) MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = µ(MΓ).
Proof Proof of (0). We show µ(MΓ) ⊆M|∼(Γ). Let v ∈ µ(MΓ) and α ∈ |∼(Γ).
Then, α ∈ Td(µ(MΓ)). Thus, µ(MΓ) ⊆Mα. Thus, v ∈Mα and we are done.
In addition, obviously, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ. Therefore, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ ∩M|∼(Γ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ).
Proof of (1). Let α, β ∈ F and suppose β ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ) and ¬α ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ),¬β).
Then, by (0), µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ . But, β 6∈ |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)). Thus, µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬β .
Consequently, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬β ⊆M¬α. Therefore, α 6∈ Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
Proof of (2). Let α, β ∈ F and suppose α ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ)) \ |∼(Γ) and β ∈ ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ),¬α) \ |∼(Γ).
Then, by (0), µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mα. But, α 6∈ Td(µ(MΓ)). Thus, µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬α.
Thus, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),¬α ⊆Mβ . But, β 6∈ Td(µ(MΓ)). Therefore µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬β .
Thus, by (A3), µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬α ∩M¬β = M¬(α∨β). Consequently, α ∨ β 6∈ Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
Proof of (3). Let α ∈ |∼(Γ). Then, α ∈ Td(µ(MΓ)). Thus, µ(MΓ) 6⊆M¬α.
Thus, by (0), MΓ,|∼(Γ) 6⊆M¬α.
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Proof of (4). Case 1: M ′Γ = ∅. Obvious.
Case 2: M ′Γ 6= ∅.
It is sufficient to show by induction: ∀ i ∈ [1, n(Γ)],
p(i) (M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
i
Γ) ∩ µ(MΓ) = ∅.
We will show:
(4.0) p(1) holds.
Let i ∈ [1, n(Γ)− 1]. Suppose p(i). We show p(i+ 1).
Case 1: M i+1Γ ∩ µ(MΓ) = ∅.
Then, by p(i), we obviously get p(i+ 1).
Case 2: ∃ v ∈M i+1Γ ∩ µ(MΓ).
Then, ∃ β ∈ F , β 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ ⊆Mβ , and v 6∈M¬β .
Therefore, by (0) and p(i), µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M iΓ ⊆Mβ . But, µ(MΓ) 6⊆M¬β .
Consequently, β ∈ Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ), which is impossible.
Proof of (4.0). Suppose the contrary of p(1), i.e. suppose ∃ v ∈M1Γ ∩ µ(MΓ).
Then, ∃ β ∈ F , β 6∈ |∼(Γ), MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ and v 6∈M¬β .
Therefore, by (0), µ(MΓ) ⊆Mβ . On the other hand, µ(MΓ) 6⊆M¬β .
Therefore, β ∈ Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ), which is impossible.
Proof of (5). As µ(MΓ) ∈ D, ∃ Γ′ ⊆ F , MΓ′ = µ(MΓ).
Therefore, MT (µ(MΓ)) =MT (MΓ′ ) = MΓ′ = µ(MΓ).
Thus, MΓ,|∼(Γ),Tc(µ(MΓ)) = MΓ,Td(µ(MΓ)),Tc(µ(MΓ)) =MΓ,T (µ(MΓ)). But, Γ ⊆ T (µ(MΓ)).
Therefore, MΓ,T (µ(MΓ)) = MT (µ(MΓ)) = µ(MΓ).
Proof of (6). Suppose M ′Γ 6= ∅. Direction: “⊆”.
Case 1: ∃ v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
n(Γ)
Γ , v 6∈MTc(µ(MΓ)).
Then, ∃ α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)), v 6∈Mα.
By Lemma 39 (3), Lemma 38 (7), and (A3), MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . .∪M
n(Γ)
Γ ⊆M¬βΓ ⊆M¬(βΓ∧α).
By (0) and Lemma 39 (1), µ(MΓ) ⊆MβΓ ∩Mα =M¬¬(βΓ∧α).
Therefore, ¬(βΓ ∧ α) 6∈ Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
In addition, v 6∈Mα ⊇M¬¬(βΓ∧α).
Consequently, v ∈Mn(Γ)+1Γ (take ¬(βΓ ∧ α) for the β of the definition of M iΓ).
Therefore, by Lemma 38 (6), we get a contradiction.
Case 2: MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M1Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
n(Γ)
Γ ⊆MTc(µ(MΓ)).
Then, by Lemma 39 (6), Lemma 39 (4), Lemma 38 (7), and by (5), we get
MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M
1
Γ ∪ . . . ∪M
n(Γ)
Γ ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),Tc(µ(MΓ)) = µ(MΓ).
Direction: “⊇”.
By (0), (4), Lemma 39 (4), and Lemma 39 (6), we get
µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ) \M
′
Γ =MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ).
Proof of (7). Suppose M ′Γ = ∅. Direction: “⊇”.
Suppose the contrary of what we want to show, i.e. suppose ∃ v ∈MTc(µ(MΓ)), v 6∈MG(Γ).
Then, ∃ α ∈ G(Γ), v 6∈Mα.
Case 1 : α ∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
As α ∈ G(Γ), α 6∈ |∼(Γ). Thus, by Lemma 39 (5), α 6∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
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Therefore, α ∈ Tc(MΓ,|∼(Γ)). Consequently, by (0), α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)).
Thus, v ∈Mα, which is impossible.
Case 2: ¬α ∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
As α ∈ G(Γ), ¬α 6∈ |∼(Γ). Thus, by Lemma 39 (5), ¬α 6∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Therefore, ¬α ∈ Tc(MΓ,|∼(Γ)). Consequently, by (A3), α ∈ Tc(MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Therefore, by (0), α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)). Thus, v ∈Mα, which is impossible.
Case 3 : α 6∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)) and ¬α 6∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Then, by (A2), MΓ,|∼(Γ),α 6⊆M¬α. Therefore, α ∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α).
But, α ∈ G(Γ). Thus, Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α) ⊆ |∼(Γ). Thus, α ∈ |∼(Γ). Thus, α 6∈ G(Γ), impossible.
Direction: “⊆”.
Suppose the contrary of what we want to show, i.e. suppose ∃ v ∈MG(Γ), v 6∈MTc(µ(MΓ)).
Then, we will show:
(7.0) ∃ α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)), |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α| < |µ(MΓ)|
But, µ(MΓ) ⊆Mα and, by (0), µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ). Therefore, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),α.
Thus, |µ(MΓ)| ≤ |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α|, which is impossible by (7.0).
Proof of (7.0). We have ∃ δ ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)), v 6∈Mδ.
By (A1), |MΓ,|∼(Γ),δ| is finite. To show (7.0), it suffices to show by induction (in the decreasing
direction): ∀ i ∈ Z with i ≤ |MΓ,|∼(Γ),δ|,
p(i) ∃ α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)), v 6∈Mα and |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α| − |µ(MΓ)| ≤ i.
Obviously, p(|MΓ,|∼(Γ),δ|) holds (take δ).
Let i ∈ Z with i ≤ |MΓ,|∼(Γ),δ| and suppose p(i) holds. We show p(i− 1).
We have ∃ α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)), v 6∈Mα and |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α| − |µ(MΓ)| ≤ i.
Case 1: Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α) ⊆ |∼(Γ).
As α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)) and (A3) holds, we get ¬α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)).
But, Tc(µ(MΓ)) ∩ Td(µ(MΓ)) = ∅. Thus, neither α nor ¬α belongs to Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
Consequently, α ∈ G(Γ). Thus, v ∈Mα, which is impossible.
Case 2: ∃ β ∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α), β 6∈ |∼(Γ).
By (0), µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ). On the other hand, µ(MΓ) ⊆Mα. Thus, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),α ⊆Mβ .
But, β 6∈ |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)). Therefore, µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬β .
Consequently, µ(MΓ) ⊆Mα ∩M¬β =Mα∧¬β and µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬α ⊆M¬(α∧¬β).
Therefore, α ∧ ¬β ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)).
Moreover, v 6∈Mα ⊇Mα∧¬β .
In addition, MΓ,|∼(Γ),α∧¬β ⊆MΓ,|∼(Γ),α, whilst MΓ,|∼(Γ),α 6⊆M¬β ⊇MΓ,|∼(Γ),α∧¬β .
Thus |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α∧¬β| ≤ |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α| − 1. Thus, |MΓ,|∼(Γ),α∧¬β| − |µ(MΓ)| ≤ i− 1.
Therefore, p(i− 1) holds (take α ∧ ¬β).
Proof of (8). Suppose M ′Γ = ∅.
Now, suppose the contrary of what we want to show, i.e. ∃ v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ), v 6∈MG(Γ).
Then, ∃ α ∈ G(Γ), v 6∈Mα.
Case 1: α ∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
As, α ∈ G(Γ), α 6∈ |∼(Γ). Therefore, by Lemma 39 (5), α 6∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Thus, α ∈ Tc(MΓ,|∼(Γ)). Therefore, MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mα. Consequently, v ∈Mα, which is impossible.
Case 2: ¬α ∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
As, α ∈ G(Γ), ¬α 6∈ |∼(Γ). Therefore, by Lemma 39 (5), ¬α 6∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Thus, ¬α ∈ Tc(MΓ,|∼(Γ)). Therefore, by (A3), MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆M¬¬α =Mα.
Consequently, v ∈Mα, which is impossible.
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Case 3: α 6∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)) and ¬α 6∈ T (MΓ,|∼(Γ)).
Then, by (A2), MΓ,|∼(Γ),α 6⊆M¬α. Thus, α ∈ Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α). But, α ∈ G(Γ). Thus, α 6∈ |∼(Γ).
Therefore, Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),α) 6⊆ |∼(Γ). Consequently, α 6∈ G(Γ), which is impossible.
Proof of (9). Case 1: M ′Γ = ∅.
By Lemma 39 (6), MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ).
But, by (8), (7), and (5), MΓ,|∼(Γ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),G(Γ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ),Tc(µ(MΓ)) = µ(MΓ).
Case 2: M ′Γ 6= ∅. Obvious by (6).
Proof of (10).
Case 1: M ′Γ = ∅.
Case 1.1: ∃ v ∈MΓ,|∼(Γ), v 6∈MTc(µ(MΓ)).
Case 1.1.1: Γ is not consistent.
Then, ∃α ∈ Tc(µ(MΓ)), v 6∈Mα and, as Γ is not consistent, ∃β ∈ F , MΓ ⊆Mβ and MΓ ⊆M¬β .
We have MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆MΓ ⊆Mβ ⊆Mβ∨¬α.
Moreover, µ(MΓ) ⊆MΓ ⊆M¬β . Thus, µ(MΓ) ⊆M¬β ∩Mα =M¬(β∨¬α).
Therefore, β ∨ ¬α 6∈ Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
In addition, v 6∈Mα ⊇M¬(β∨¬α).
Consequently, v ∈M1Γ (take β ∨ ¬α for the β of the definition of M1Γ).
Thus, v ∈M ′Γ, which is impossible.
Case 1.1.2: Γ is consistent.
Thus, MΓ ∈ C. Therefore, as µ is coherency preserving, µ(MΓ) ∈ C. Thus, Tc(µ(MΓ)) = ∅.
Therefore, MTc(µ(MΓ)) = V . Thus, v ∈MTc(µ(MΓ)), which is impossible.
Case 1.2: MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆MTc(µ(MΓ)).
Then, by Lemma 39 (6), MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ),F (Γ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),Tc(µ(MΓ)).
Therefore, by (5), MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = µ(MΓ).
Case 2: M ′Γ 6= ∅. Obvious by (6).
Now comes the proof of Proposition 36 (which is stated at the beginning of Section 3.3).
Proof Proof of (0). Direction: “→”.
There exists a CP DP coherent choice function µ from D to P(V) such that
∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)).
We will show:
(0.0) |∼ satisfies (|∼0).
By Lemma 40 (1), (2), and (3), |∼ satisfies (|∼6), (|∼7), and (|∼8).
By Lemma 40 (10) and Coherence of µ, |∼ satisfies (|∼9).
We will show:
(0.1) |∼ satisfies (|∼11).
Direction: “←”.
Suppose |∼ satisfies (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8), (|∼9), and (|∼11).
Then, let µ be the function from D to P(V) such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , µ(MΓ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ).
We will show:
(0.2) µ is well-defined.
Clearly, µ is a DP choice function.
In addition, as |∼ satisfies (|∼9), µ is coherent.
We will show:
(0.3) µ is CP.
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And finally, by Lemma 39 (7), ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)).
Proof of (0.0). Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F and suppose ⊢(Γ) = ⊢(∆). Then, MΓ =M∆.
Therefore, |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)) = Td(µ(M∆)) = |∼(∆).
Proof of (0.1). Let Γ ⊆ F and suppose Γ is consistent.
Then, MΓ ∈ D ∩C. Thus, as µ is CP, µ(MΓ) ∈ C. Therefore, Td(µ(MΓ)) = T (µ(MΓ)).
Consequently, Γ ⊆ T (MΓ) ⊆ T (µ(MΓ)) = Td(µ(MΓ)) = |∼(Γ).
In addition, M|∼(Γ) = MTd(µ(MΓ)) =MT (µ(MΓ)). But, µ(MΓ) ∈ C. Thus, MT (µ(MΓ)) ∈ C.
Consequently, |∼(Γ) is consistent.
And finally, |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)) = T (µ(MΓ)) = T (MT (µ(MΓ))) = T (M|∼(Γ)) = ⊢(|∼(Γ)).
Proof of (0.2). Let Γ,∆ ⊆ F and suppose MΓ =M∆.
Then, ⊢(Γ) = ⊢(∆). Thus, by (|∼0), |∼(Γ) = |∼(∆).
Consequently,H(Γ) = H(∆). Therefore, MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) = M∆,|∼(∆),H(∆).
Proof of (0.3). Suppose V ∈ D ∩C. Then, ∃ Γ ⊆ F , V = MΓ.
Case 1: H1(Γ) 6= ∅.
Thus, ∃ β ∈ F , β 6∈ |∼(Γ) and MΓ,|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ .
By (|∼11), Γ ⊆ |∼(Γ) and ⊢(|∼(Γ)) = |∼(Γ). Thus, MΓ,|∼(Γ) =M|∼(Γ). Thus, M|∼(Γ) ⊆Mβ .
Therefore, β ∈ T (M|∼(Γ)) = ⊢(|∼(Γ)) = |∼(Γ), which is impossible.
Case 2: H1(Γ) = ∅.
Then, H(Γ) = ∅. Thus, µ(V ) = µ(MΓ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ) =M|∼(Γ).
But, by (|∼11), |∼(Γ) is consistent. Therefore,M|∼(Γ) ∈ C.
proof of (1). Direction: “→”.
Verbatim the proof of (0), except that in addition µ is LM.
Then, by Lemma 40 (10) and LM, |∼ satisfies (|∼10).
Direction: “←”.
Verbatim the proof of (0), except that in addition |∼ satisfies (|∼10).
Then, by definition of µ and (|∼10), µ is LM.
Proof of (2). Direction: “→”.
Verbatim the proof of (0), except that µ is no longer CP, whilst (A2) now holds.
Note that, in (0), CP was used only to show (|∼11) and (|∼9).
But, (|∼11) is no longer required to hold.
In addition, by Lemma 40 (9) and Coherence of µ, (|∼9) holds.
Direction: “←”.
Verbatim the proof of (0), except that (|∼11) does no longer hold, whilst (A2) now holds.
However, in (0), (|∼11) was used only to show that µ is CP, which is no longer required.
Note that we do not need to use (A2) in this direction.
Proof of (3). Direction “→”.
Verbatim the proof of (0), except that µ is no longer CP, whilst µ is now LM and (A2) now holds.
Note that, in (0), CP was used only to show (|∼11) and (|∼9).
But, (|∼11) is no longer required.
In addition, by Lemma 40 (9) and Coherence of µ, (|∼9) holds.
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Similarly, by Lemma 40 (9) and Local Monotonicity of µ, (|∼10) holds.
Direction: “←”.
Verbatim the proof of (0), except that (|∼11) does no longer hold, whilst (|∼10) and (A2) now holds.
Note that, in (0), (|∼11) was used only to show that µ is CP, which is no longer required.
Now, by definition of µ and by (|∼10), µ is LM.
Note that we do not need to use (A2) in this direction.
3.4 The discriminative and not necessarily definability preserving case
Unlike in Section 3.3, the conditions of this section will not be purely syntactic. The translation of
properties like Coherence in syntactic terms is blocked because we do no longer have the following
useful equality: µ(MΓ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ), which holds when the choice functions under considera-
tion are definability preserving (but this is not the case here). Thanks to Lemmas 29 and 30 (stated
in Section 3.2), we will provide a solution with semi-syntactic conditions.
Notation 41 Let L be a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, F the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉
a semantic structure, and |∼ a relation on P(F)×F .
Then, consider the following condition: ∀ Γ ⊆ F ,
(|∼12) ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ), H(Γ)) = T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈M|∼(∆),H(∆)}).
Proposition 42 Let L be a language, ¬ a unary connective of L, ∨ and ∧ binary connectives of L,
F the set of all wffs of L, 〈F ,V , |=〉 a semantic structure satisfying (A1) and (A3), and |∼ a relation
on P(F)×F . Then,
(0) |∼ is a CP preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8), (|∼11)
and (|∼12) hold.
Suppose 〈F ,V , |=〉 satisfies (A2) too. Then,
(1) |∼ is a preferential-discriminative consequence relation iff (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8), and (|∼12)
hold.
Proof Proof of (1). Direction: “→”.
There exists a coherent choice function µ from D to P(V) such that ∀Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)).
Then, |∼ satisfies obviously (|∼0).
Let f be the function from D to D such that ∀ V ∈ D, f(V ) =MT (µ(V )).
Then, by Lemma 30, ∀ V ∈ D, f(V ) = MT (µf (V )).
Moreover, ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) = MT (µ(MΓ)) ⊆MT (MΓ) = MΓ.
Therefore, f is a choice function.
Obviously, f is DP.
In addition, ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(µ(MΓ)) = Td(MT (µ(MΓ))) = Td(f(MΓ)).
Consequently, by Lemma 40 (1), (2), and (3), |∼ satisfies (|∼6), (|∼7), and (|∼8).
In addition, by Lemma 40 (9), ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ).
We show that |∼ satisfies (|∼12). Let Γ ⊆ F .
Then, ⊢(Γ, |∼(Γ), H(Γ)) = T (MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ)) = T (f(MΓ)) = T (MT (µf(MΓ))) = T (µf (MΓ)) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀W ∈ D, if v ∈W ⊆MΓ, then v ∈ f(W )}) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈ f(M∆)}) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈M∆,|∼(∆),H(∆)}) =
T ({v ∈MΓ : ∀∆ ⊆ F , if v ∈M∆ ⊆MΓ, then v ∈M|∼(∆),H(∆)}).
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Direction: “←”.
Suppose (|∼0), (|∼6), (|∼7), (|∼8), and (|∼12) hold.
Let f be the function from D to D such that ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ).
By (|∼0), f is well-defined.
By Lemma 39 (7), ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ)).
Therefore, ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(f(MΓ)).
By (|∼12), ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) =MT (µf (MΓ)).
Therefore, ∀ Γ ⊆ F , |∼(Γ) = Td(f(MΓ)) = Td(MT (µf (MΓ))) = Td(µf (MΓ)).
But, by Lemma 29, µf is a coherent choice function.
Proof of (0). Direction: “→”.
Verbatim the proof of (1), except that (A2) does no longer hold, whilst µ is now CP.
Note that (A2) was used only to apply Lemma 40 (9) to get ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) = MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ).
But, we will get this equality by another mean.
Indeed, if V ∈ D ∩C, then, as µ is CP, µ(V ) ∈ C, thus MT (µ(V )) ∈ C, thus f(V ) ∈ C.
Therefore f is CP.
Consequently, by Lemma 40 (10), we get ∀ Γ ⊆ F , f(MΓ) =MΓ,|∼(Γ),H(Γ).
In addition, by verbatim the proof of (0.1) of Proposition 36, |∼ satisfies (|∼11).
Direction: “←”.
Verbatim the proof of (1), except that (A2) does no longer hold, whilst |∼ now satisfies (|∼11).
But, in this direction, (A2) was not used in (0).
It remains to show that µf is CP.
By verbatim the proof of (0.3) of Proposition 36, we get that f is CP.
Let V ∈ D∩C. Then, f(V ) ∈ C. Thus, MT (µf (V )) ∈ C. Thus, µf (V ) ∈ C and we are done.
4 Conclusion
We provided, in a general framework, characterizations for families of preferential(-discriminative)
consequence relations. Note that we have been strongly inspired by the work of Schlechta in the
non-discriminative case, whilst we developed new techniques and ideas in the discriminative case.
In many cases, our conditions are purely syntactic. In fact, when the choice functions under consid-
eration are not necessarily definability preserving, we provided solutions with semi-syntactic condi-
tions. We managed to do so thanks to Lemmas 29 and 30. An interesting thing is that we used them
both in the plain and the discriminative versions. This suggests that they can be used in yet other
versions. In addition, we are quite confident that Lemmas 39 and 40 can be used to characterize
other families of consequence relations defined in the discriminative manner by DP choice functions
(not necessarily coherent, unlike all the families investigated here).
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